186 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



the ethical problem, we find that the whole tenor of his 

 thought is more akin to that of the German idealists 

 than to that of Kant or of English psychology or 

 common-sense. His philosophy is dogmatic in the sense 

 of being uncritical, forming thus an opposition to Kant's 

 method, and his method is synthetic or constructive in 

 opposition to the analytic method represented in 

 English thought pre-eminently by the two Mills and 

 by Alexander Bain. It also resembles the speculations 

 of Schelling and Hegel ^ in this, that it has a profound 



1 Nothing is more striking than 

 the similarity which exists in niauj' 

 respects between such opposite 

 systems as those of Comte and 

 Hegel. Not only the dogmatic, 

 the architectonic, and the profound 

 historical spirit are common to both, 

 but even the abstract notions and 

 the vocabulary of the idealistic 

 sj'stem may be easily translated 

 into those of the positivist. This 

 has in fact been done already with- 

 out any knowledge of Comte's 

 writings, to a lartje extent by Lud- 

 wig Feuerbach in the expressive 

 formula : homo homini JJeus. And 

 so far as Ethics is concerned the 

 two systems agree in this, that their 

 spirit is essentially ethical in the 

 deepest sense of the term, but that, 

 on the other side, the more specific 

 problems of ethical science, as 

 treated by ancient thinkers, by 

 philosophers in this country and, 

 quite recently, in all the three 

 countries alike, receive in the two 

 systems which represent two lead- 

 ing tendencies of modern thought 

 no systematic treatment. We look 

 there in vain for strict definition of 

 such notions as the Good, Virtue, 

 Dutj' and their relations. The 

 ethical views of Hegel as well as 

 those of Comte have to be collected 

 from difi"erent passages and periods 

 of their respective writings. But 



Hegel's philosophy sprang, as did 

 that of Kant and Fichte, from the 

 same root of a strong moral con- 

 viction regarding the task which 

 philosophy, as the intellectual train- 

 ing and discipline of the mind, was 

 destined to perform in his age and 

 country. A similar intellectualism, 

 joined to a deep moral conviction, 

 is likewise characteristic of Comte. 

 In both cases the intellectual prin- 

 ciple, a definite theory of reality, 

 being gained, the application to 

 detailed problems such as those of 

 religion and ethics, had to follow. 

 The application was made by those 

 who came after. In connection with 

 Hegel's philosophy the religious 

 problem was taken up in Germany 

 and, a generation later, the ethical 

 problem in England. Comte him- 

 self turned only quite late, as stated 

 in the text, to Ethics, confining him- 

 self mainly to the development of 

 the religion of humanit}'. Though 

 this has been practically abandoned 

 in this country, an important school 

 of positivist ethical doctrine has 

 sprung up with an increasing in- 

 fluence on French thought. Quite 

 independent of the idealist and 

 positivist conception of ethics the 

 influence of Kant is also increas- 

 ingly felt both in Germany and in 

 France. It may also here be re- 

 marked that, as in so many other 



