OF THE GOOD. 233 



tagonistic view, urged by Huxley, that the cosmic and 

 moral orders are in hopeless conflict. It avoids the 

 latter view because it regards the moral ideas and in- 

 stitutions of man as part of the complete process, as 

 factors in the movement which leads in time from nature 

 to spirit. And it avoids the former view because it 

 holds that the ethical element which is manifested latest 

 in the temporal process, is presupposed from the first and 

 necessary to the understanding of the whole. The ideal 

 of goodness may contribute towards the interpretation 

 of evolution, but its own explanation must be sought 

 by another method." ^ 



Attempts to arrive at a synthesis of idealism and 65. 



Attempts at 



naturalism have formed the characteristic feature of synthesis of 



idealism and 



French philosophy in quite recent times. Forty years ^^t^aiism. 

 ago it looked as if France had lost for a time its 

 international influence on philosophical thought, the 

 philosophy of Comte having been its last contribution. 

 In a similar way the philosophy of Germany had already 

 before that time, with the collapse of Hegelianism in its 

 own country, ceased to exercise a leading European 

 influence. In both countries philosophical thought 

 seemed to have spent its creative power. Being at home 

 fully occupied with criticising, assimilating, and modi- 

 fying the new matter and novel ideas contained in those 

 two great systems, it could not settle down and con- 

 centrate itself upon any definite and commanding idea. 

 Each of these two systems had also bequeathed to the age 

 that followed them a definite task which planned out the 

 work for many minds and many years. This task was 



1 Sorley, ' Ethics of Naturalism' (2ncl ed., 1904, p. 332). 



