238 



PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



they appear, e.g., in the system of Spencer, but that 

 from them proceeds an initiative, not only in the inner, 

 but also in the outer life of the human mind. He 

 further maintains that all psychical states, be they 

 sensations, thoughts, emotions, or desires, are intimately 

 connected, that they cannot be isolated and treated as 

 independent elements of the inner life. He thus opposes 

 likewise the older psychological atomism, maintaining 

 that we feel, think, and react in every instant of our 

 conscious inner life ; only it may happen that, in this 

 fundamental and united function, either feelings and 

 emotions, or definite thoughts, or activities of the will, 

 step into the foreground. In fact, " every state of 

 consciousness, by reason of its proper intensity or of its 

 force, tends to determine movements more or less in- 

 tensive and extensive." Thinking, feeling, and willing 

 are therefore always connected with some movement, and 

 this is both an internal change and an external motion. 

 The partial separation of thinking and motion, of thought 

 and action, is acquired under the influence of education 

 and culture both of the individual and the race. With 

 children and savages this distinct separation is rare or 

 altogether absent. Further, " every idea is an image 

 and in consequence a ' Together ' of recalled sensations 

 and movements." ^ 



Fouill^e begins his criticism of the Ethics of Natural- 



^ As already stated there is no 

 equivalent in English for the word 

 ensemble. Fouillee is one of the 

 most prominent representatives of 

 the tendency of thought repeatedly 

 referred to in these volumes, a 

 tendency vyhich I have defined as 



"the synoptic aspect of reaHty," and 

 of which I have treated separately 

 in two papers published respectively 

 in the 3rd and 5th vols, of the 

 ' Proceedings of the University of 

 Durham Philosophical Society ' 

 1910 and 1913. 



