OF THE GOOD. 245 



What is peculiar to the school is, however, the limit- 

 ation to the purely psychological or anthropological 

 aspect, the metaphysical being discarded. It is owing 

 to this circumstance, to their distrust of metaphysics, 

 that these thinkers show little sympathy with, and little 

 appreciation of, the system of Lotze, which they mostly 

 ignore. To Lotze, nevertheless, is due the merit of 

 having for the first time clearly distinguished between 

 the three seemingly independent, but interwoven, aspects 

 which the world presents to the contemplating mind : 

 the world of things or facts, the world of relations or 

 laws, and the world of values or worths. Lotze is at 

 the same time the first thinker who has coined a 

 fairly comprehensive vocabulary wherein to express the 

 doctrines of a science of value, or, as it has been more 

 recently termed, of Axiology. 



Although this school has opened out and is culti- 

 vating a new region in Psychology — a region in which 

 individual and social interests, the ethics of morality and 

 of legality meet — and has thus enlarged the aspect of 

 one side of moral philosophy, it has not so far suc- 

 ceeded in establishing any new conceptions regarding 

 the central ethical problems : the problem of Good and 

 Evil, the problem of Duty and Obligation, the problem 

 of Virtue and Happiness, the problem of Ends and 

 Motives of conduct ; nor is it likely that the purely 

 descriptive, analytical, or historical method will take us 

 any further as regards those fundamental questions. It 

 is therefore not surprising that another direction of 

 thought has sprung up which shows little appreciation 

 for these purely descriptive, analytical, and historical 



