278 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



In the well-known dictum of the latter, in which he 

 opposed Locke, we have the first terse and pregnant 

 expression of a truth of common -sense which is con- 

 tinually overlooked in science as well as in everyday 

 life — viz., that one cannot have a spectacle without a 

 spectator. 



The interests of science as well as those of common 

 life are frequently better served by regarding only one 

 side of the dualism, or by regarding the two sides alter- 

 nately ; but it is the object of philosophy, inter alia, ever 

 and again to remind us that in reality the two sides are 

 always present, that the twofold order of things inherent 

 in the human constitution is indissolubly intertwined. 

 It is perhaps not too much to say that the whole of 

 nineteenth century philosophy is an attempt to give a 

 clearer expression to the fact that this twofold order 

 exists, and further to support the conviction that this 

 dualism is resolved and has its source in some initial 

 and underlying unity. 



In the first of his three ' Critiques ' Kant lays bare the 

 intellectual process, showing that sensuous knowledge is 

 alone constitutive, and that the transcendental element 

 only comes in as a unifying and regulative principle. 

 But what is a matter of mere order and arrangement 

 in the intellectual process of the human mind becomes a 

 constitutive principle in the sphere of action and moral 

 conduct. In this sphere the transcendental or higher 

 order asserts itself, not only as the rule or formula of 

 existence, but as a distinct command or law : what 

 Kant termed the categorical imperative, the fact or 

 sense of moral obligation. 



