OF THE SPIRIT. 279 



It was the latter part of Kant's doctrine which 

 not only attracted a large number of his followers 

 and disciples, but also gave it special value in the 

 eyes of Schiller and Fichte, who were the first to 

 attempt a further development of Kant's teaching on 

 original lines. Unfortunately, however, Kant had not 

 put the dualism which is inherent in the human aspect 

 of things quite in the right light. This dualism, in the 

 course of further criticism, especially through psycho- 

 logical analysis, has been more correctly expressed than 

 Kant was able to express it. 



We now understand that the twofold aspect is owing 

 to the difference of what may be termed external sen- 

 sations and the inner sense of a combining unity. Now, 

 although this distinction, which has been much more 

 rigidly adhered to in British philosophy, was recognised 

 by Kant, it was unfortunately mixed up with another 

 distinction which tends to obliterate it, and to shift 

 the whole problem on to a different ground. 



This second formula was introduced into Kantian 

 philosophy from the Leibniz-Wolffian school. It is the 

 supposed difference between a sensible and an intel- is. 



,. ., , ^^ . Mixed with 



ligible world or, as Kant expresses it, between the duality of 



sensible and 



phenomenal and the noumenal order of things. This i»teiiigibie 



■^ o world. 



distinction implies that there are things of which we 

 can become immediately cognisant through our senses, 

 and that there are other things which we know of only 

 mediately through thought, and it was accompanied by 

 the tacit assumption that the former things constitute, 

 as it were, a lower order as compared with the others 

 which constitute the higher order of things; thus in- 



