OF THE SPIRIT. 337 



a seemingly almost endless application of these relations 

 or so-called laws of nature, and latterly by a successful 

 unification of apparently quite disparate scientific aspects. 

 The argument against the supernatural has therefore 

 been strengthened not only in the direction of histori- 

 cal evidence against isolated miraculous events, but also 

 — and this is much more important — by arriving at 

 a clearer definition of what this unalterable order really 

 consists in, an order in which Hume, and still more his 

 predecessors in ancient philosophy, had only a general 

 and axiomatic belief. The human mind, even in its 

 most exalted and far-seeing representatives, can only 

 take in a very small portion of reality. It is apt to be 

 unduly impressed with the importance of such arguments 

 and lines of reasoning as form the region and the sub- 

 ject of its own spontaneous thoughts. Accordingly 

 scientific authorities, notably those who deal with the 

 most abstract and most clearly defined sequences of 

 thought, are apt to attach an importance to them which 

 is unduly exaggerated if they be regarded from that 

 universal position which is the only one that becomes 

 the philosophic, ^as distinguished from the scientific, 

 mind. The latter has reached the highest only when it 

 has been able to demonstrate the truth or applicability 

 of one principle, or at most, of a very small number 

 of detached principles. The philosophic mind, on the 

 other hand, has always attained its highest when it was 

 able to demonstrate the limitation of any single principle 

 and to rise to the idea that some point of view must 

 exist which is much higher than all or any of those 

 VOL, IV. Y 



