OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 595 



of the nineteenth century, we find there the most pro- o. 



•^ '- Change in 



nounced expression of that contrast which I have just ^^'^^fj^'f^ 

 named. At the beginning of the century we find a suc- 

 cession of philosophical systems. Kant's philosophy, 

 though it never called itself a system, enjoyed still a 

 foremost place in the philosophical world. Several 

 thinkers were occupied in giving to it that system- 

 atic unity of which they thought it stood in need. 

 Following the earliest attempt of Eeinhold we find a 

 variety of attempts, such as that of Krug and, 

 somewhat later, that of Fries ; then we have in rapid 

 succession the professedly systematic work of Fichte, 

 Schelling, and Hegel. The latter probably marks the 

 culmination of the systematic interest. This is less 

 prominent, though still active, in Herbart and Schleier- 

 macher, but it is revived again in an extreme form in 

 Schopenhauer, whose system was complete forty years 

 before it became generally known and appreciated. 

 Simultaneously we can trace the breaking up of the 

 systematic and comprehensive treatment of the philo- 

 sophical problem in such writers as Beneke, who, influ- 

 enced by Herbart, by English thought and by the 

 empirical sciences alike, was the first important thinker 

 in Germany who treated special philosophical problems, 

 such as the psychological and the ethical problems, as 

 separate and distinct branches in a way similar to that 

 which prevailed in this country. The disintegration of 

 systematic philosophy was further assisted in Germany 

 by the introduction of other questions which had re- 

 ceived little attention in the great philosophical systems, 

 but which, nevertheless, demanded theoretical treatment. 



