OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 601 



should we, in the course of our speculation, be led to 

 assume two or more principles, the task would still 

 remain to show how these different principles inter- 

 act so as to lead to that connection which we must 

 assume to exist in every world which is One world. 

 And Lotze is still more opposed to postulating a unity 

 of method. For this latter assumption there is neither 

 need nor justification, Eather we must claim for our 

 investigation " complete freedom to make use of any 

 possible device which, in the position that we human 

 beings occupy in the midst of all reality, may lead us 

 by straight or circuitous paths to an accurate compre- 

 hension of that reality." Every investigation, how- 

 ever, assumes not only the existence of a Truth in 

 the world, but further also that we are in possession 

 of formal rules of thought which permit us to deduce 

 from any assumed truth by a necessary process other 

 truths possessing a definite meaning. 



We may now compare the position which Lotze takes 

 up with that which has influenced all recent, but notably 

 all German, philosophy, viz., the earlier position of Kant. 

 And here we find an agreement as well as a marked dif- 

 ference. Both Kant and Lotze begin their speculation by 

 a reflection on the possibility and the means of philoso- 

 phising, but Kant exaggerates this preliminary or critical 

 undertaking to such an extent that he apparently loses 

 sight of the ultimate object — the unification and sys- 

 tematisation of thought. This he promised to give in 

 a future system, — a promise which was never fulfilled. 

 Lotze, however, admits that all important philosophical 

 questions are dealt with in Kant's critical writings, and 



