606 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



of this development has been the breaking up of the 

 philosophical problem into a variety of distinct problems, 

 such as I have dealt with in the foregoing chapters. 

 We may say that the main cause of this new departure 

 was the growth and diffusion of the scientific spirit on the 

 one side, of the historical and critical spirit on the other. 

 This new spirit, which is characteristic of nineteenth 

 century thought, dispelled, for a time at least, what we 

 may term the genuinely philosophical interest which is 

 directed towards a unification of thought. 



So far as the Kantian philosophy is concerned it was 

 very early recognised that not only did it harbour an in- 

 herent dualism, but that, moreover, it was based upon 

 certain facts and assumptions which were insufficiently 

 proved or not even clearly set out. Notably the first 

 ' Critique ' started with definitions and distinctions adopted 

 without sulhcient justification from the Aristotelian logic 

 and from the traditional psychology of the schools. 

 With notions mainly drawn from these sources Kant 

 attempted to criticise the notions of the traditional 

 metaphysic of the schools and, at the same time, to 

 reply to the doubts which had gradually sprung up 

 through Locke's, Berkeley's, and Hume's original investi- 

 gations. To many thinkers Kant's critical work did not 

 appear to be thorough enough. It had, moreover, taken 

 over from those various sources an amount of dry and 

 unnecessary formalism which obscured the main points, 

 made the study of his works unnecessarily laborious, and 

 might possibly carry into the ultimate conclusions hidden 

 errors which a more careful scrutiny would be able to 

 correct. What was indeed wanted was a new and 



