OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 615 



well-defined body of beliefs, of a religious faith expressed 

 in a small number of well-defined Articles. The second 

 assumption is : that the human mind is in possession — 

 or at least in confident search — of a method by which 

 these definite and generally accepted Articles of Faith 

 can be rationalised and brought into reasoned connec- 

 tion with the large body of existing natural, scientific, 

 and historical knowledge. These two assumptions, which 

 formed as it were the background of all philosophical 

 speculation in Germany for at least two-thirds of a cen- 

 tury, beginning with the year 1770, cannot nowadays 

 be safely taken for granted by any philosophical writer. 

 Both require, to say the least, a preliminary justification 

 based upon a searching analysis. 



The task of mediating between two forms of 

 knowledge, or between Knowledge and Faith, was first 

 assigned to philosophy by Leibniz, whose whole literary 

 career was characterised by the endeavour to do justice 

 to different and frequently opposed schools of thought, 

 of science, and of belief ; throwing out manifold sugges- 

 tions whereby a reconciliation might be brought about. 

 In this respect the system of Leibniz, which was only 

 adumbrated by its author but never carried out with 

 any approach to consistency and completeness, stands 

 in direct contrast to that of Spinoza, who put forward a 

 compact body of doctrine which was at once his science, 

 his philosophy, and his religion. For various reasons, 

 which for our present purpose it is not necessary to 

 enumerate, this compact and comprehensive philosophical 

 creation of Spinoza was not at the time either appreciated 

 or even understood. The many existing controversies, 



