628 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



works. Fichte uses it in the sense that all thought, 

 all knowledge, and all philosophy rest upon the unity 

 of consciousness, which cannot be demonstrated, but 

 which is felt. In the sequel Schelling adopted the 

 term as denoting the identity of a thinking subject with 

 the object of its thought. This use of the term Fichte 

 repudiated, and based upon it his emphatic denunciation 

 of Schelling's system as distinguished from his own. 



If, as I stated above, Kant took the first step from 

 the metaphysical and dogmatic to the psychological 

 treatment of the philosophical problem, Fichte took 

 a further step. To him, even more distinctly than to 

 Kant, the unity of knowledge exists and is to be realised 

 in the inner region of self-consciousness. In Kant this 

 Self appears only as the inner point of reference, the 

 unity of apperception ; in Fichte it appears as an active 

 principle, as the first and fundamental act of a thinking 

 mind. Self-consciousness is not merely a point of 

 reference, it is an act of affirmation, of self-assertion. 



It may here be remarked that the terminology 

 employed by Fichte is unfortunate and misleading, 

 more so even than that of Kant. In the use of 

 the term " ich " (I or ego), we seem to be left in un- 

 certainty whether by this term is meant the Self as one 

 among other selves, or some condition of thought or 

 feeling common to every thinking human being. In 

 the latter sense no doubt Kant used the different terms of 

 his analysis, such as Reason, Understanding, Imagination, 

 &c. There was no attempt to take note of individual 

 differences — in fact, Kant's analysis was ultimately 

 founded upon the abstract psychology and logic of the 



