OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 631 



was for a time his follower and fellow- worker, but he 

 soon separated from him when it became necessary to 

 give a more exact definition to the unifying principle 

 which, as it seemed to him, was vaguely and unsatisfac- 

 torily conceived by Fichte as self-consciousness or ex- 

 pressed by the repellent term " ego." Schelling, among 

 others, was early led to see the humorous side of Fichte's 

 terminology, and he, as well as the literary society in 

 which he moved, was hardly able to appreciate the moral 

 force and strenuous character of Fichte's personality and 

 doctrine. It seemed to them too rigid, and as such 

 deficient from a poetical and artistic point of view. 

 This want of sympathy led to an early estrangement, 

 which found expression in polemical outbursts from both 

 sides. The poetical side of Schelling's mind found satis- 

 faction in Goethe's love of nature, in what may be termed 

 the naturalism of Goethe's poetry. Schelling also came 

 into contact with eminent naturalists, and was especially 

 interested in the new discoveries by Galvani and Volta, 

 as well as in Animal Magnetism, which seemed to pro- 

 mise unexpected insight into some of the mysterious 

 phenomena of living matter. To Schelling's nature the 

 philosophy of Fichte therefore appeared too abstract and 

 logical, too rigorous and forceful : precisely the qualities 

 which recommended it to minds of a different stamp 

 and really secured for it a great personal influence. 



Looking now at the ultimate philosophical problem, 

 which, as I said before, did not present itself to 

 Schelling with the religious interest it had for Kant 

 and Fichte, the problem of the unity of thought and 

 knowledge, we find the point which marks Schelling's 



