OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 633 



the question may be asked, how does the thinking or 

 conscious self, the intellect, develop out of the ap- 

 parently unthinking and unconscious world that sur- 

 rounds it and of which it knows itself to be a part ? 

 This is the position of common-sense and of all natural 

 science, which is ultimately founded upon common-sense. 

 Schelling, in his philosophical development, goes half- 

 way to meet this position occupied by the natural 

 sciences. He cannot forget that the train of reasoning 

 from Kant to Fichte emphasised the fact that the ex- 

 ternal world exists for us only in the subjective image 

 which it occupies in our own contemplating (and active) 

 mind, and he cannot lose sight of what Kant and Fichte 

 demonstrated to be the characteristic feature of the 

 intellect : the unity of apperception with the former, 

 the fundamental act of the intellect produced by, and 

 rising into, a conscious free will, with the latter. It 

 was thus an easy step, but one which Fichte did not 

 approve of, to consider this active principle, of which 

 we become aware as Will, to exist likewise in the 

 outer world — in fact, in the whole of the universe or 

 creation. This idea was further supported by an 

 argument suggested in Kant's third ' Critique.' Kant 

 there deals with the apparent existence of End and 

 Purpose or of Design in the things of nature : he 

 also brings this into relation with the aesthetic judg- 

 ment which recognises standards of Taste and Value. 

 He stops there, however, considering the conception 

 of design in nature as merely a regulative principle 

 in human thought. Schelling went a step further : 

 he considered it as the indication of a real and active 



