OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 657 



ciples which underlie the methodical treatment of the 

 various departments of knowledge, or must have for its 

 special object the task of removing the contradictions 

 which these fundamental principles exhibit. The latter 

 is especially the object of Herbart's metaphysic and of 

 the metaphysical part of his psychology. 



In the empirical conceptions which we use in science 

 and in common life he sees manifold contradictions, and 

 he defines the object of metaphysic as being to elaborate, 

 to remodel, to " work up " the whole body of these ideas in 

 such a way that the contradictions disappear. In doing 

 so he is led to a pluralistic as opposed to a monistic view 

 of the ultimate Reality. Without being able to define 

 the latter, he conceives it accordingly as a plurality of 

 " Reals " which are simple in their nature and cannot be 

 further defined. Our thought and knowledge turns 

 entirely upon the relations in which these ultimate 

 " Reals " or atoms of existence stand to each other. 



As I have had occasion to show in an earlier chapter, 

 Herbart's realistic philosophy had considerable influence 

 in correcting the abstractions of idealism and bringing 

 back philosophical thought to the level of detailed 

 practical research. So far as systematic philosophy is 

 concerned, his influence combined with that of the op- 

 posite school to produce an entirely altered conception 33. 

 of the object and task of philosophy. Of this altered conception 



of the 



conception the greatest, and by far the clearest, exponent task of 



^ o > J > r philosophy; 



is Hermann Lotze. ^°^^^- 



Although Lotze does not profess — and thinks it 

 impossible for the human mind — to solve the philoso- 

 phical problem, the complete unification of thought and 

 VOL. IV. 2 T 



