OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 691 



drawn from a wide range of experience. Neither does a 

 psychological analysis form an introduction to these 

 philosophies, though psychology forms an important 

 part in the large body of Spencer's speculation. As 

 psychology and the theory of knowledge form the 

 groundwork of all recent German philosophy, it is not 

 to be wondered at that neither Comte nor Spencer has 

 had much influence upon it. 



In the first part of ' i'irst Principles,' Spencer takes ei. 



^ . Recon- 



up the problem of science and religion, dealing with the <='l'^,^'°"j^°^ 

 ultimate conception to which, as it seems to him, both religion. 

 are inevitably driven. This he terms the Absolute, and 

 he shows how neither religion nor science can find an 

 adequate expression or definition of this limiting idea, 

 for both are essentially occupied with the relative. The 

 Absolute exists for the religious as well as for the 

 scientific mind, but it exists only as the opposite of 

 the Relative, the Infinite only as the opposite of the 

 Finite, the Unconditioned only as the opposite of the 

 Conditioned. Nevertheless, this conception exists and 

 cannot be dispelled ; Spencer terms it the Unknowable. 

 But he is not a thorough-going Agnostic, for he defines 

 it also as the underlying Power of which the whole 

 phenomenal world, including our own intellectual and 

 emotional experiences, is merely the manifestation. 

 Inasmuch as the latter are to us as real and important 

 as the former, Spencer considers as equally admissible 

 the religious or emotional and the scientific or intel- 

 lectual view of the world and life. In this way he 

 desires to reconcile them, but he denies that philosophy 

 can do more than admit this twofold aspect, and he at 



