OF THE UNITY OF THOUGHT. 697 



change or evolution is cast. In this respect Spencer's 

 formula, the alternation of Evolution and Dissolution, of 

 condensation and separation, of integration and differen- 

 tiation (segregation), of orderly arrangement and chaotic 

 diffusion — or in whatever other terms the rhythmical 

 process may be described — compares rather with the 

 least successful of Hegel's efforts, viz., to show how 

 the vaguer process of development as conceived by 

 Schelling and himself might be understood as the suc- 

 cessive application of a logical formula. Whereas both 

 Schelling and Hegel believed in the gradual and per- 

 sistent manifestation and realisation of an underlying 

 spirit, of a something which possessed the highest in- 

 tellectual and spiritual value and interest, Spencer de- 

 clines altogether to form any conception of the Absolute, 

 or of the significance of the world-process. He does 

 not even decide which of the two alternating processes 

 is the more important and lasting one. He is driven, 

 through the contemplation of very varied but essenti- 

 ally limited regions of phenomena, to the conception of 

 rhythmical and cyclical changes, of states which repeat 

 and return into themselves. The idea of progress, 

 therefore, in the higher sense of the word, as it 

 vivified the writings of the idealistic philosophers, is 

 absent in Spencer's philosophy. Nevertheless, he is able 

 to gain upon the foundation of his ' First Principles ' a 

 position from which the trend of social evolution and 

 the significance of morality can be understood. Society 

 is moving in the direction of more and more perfect 

 adjustment of its various parts and members through 

 adaptation to external and internal circumstances ; it is 



