732 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



sensory and motor presentations, and of considering the 

 emotional and volitional incidents as having the same 

 reality as those of the senses and the intellect. The 

 result was that the psychology of the latter had to go 

 hand in hand with that of the former. The continuity, 

 as well as the greater complexity of the field of conscious- 

 ness, was brought out still more prominently and con- 

 vincingly by the same thinker in the second volume of 

 his Gifford Lectures referred to already.-^ We learn 

 there that unity of thought and knowledge depends 

 ultimately upon the continuity and unity of conscious- 

 ness. The apparent dualism of an inner and outer 

 world, to destroy which Kant led the way in his " unity 

 of apperception," but restored again in his " Thing in 

 Itself," is superseded in Ward's fundamental thesis that 

 conscious mental life begins with the felt unity in 

 duality of subject and object. Through it there arises 

 within the individual consciousness by the active and 

 selective process of attention, and by intercourse with 

 other minds, the image of an outer world. This is not 

 opposed to, but forms a portion of, the entire world of 

 consciousness, but it acquires for practical purposes a 

 seemingly independent existence, a reality of its own, 

 supplying the material for orderly logical and scientific 

 thought. All that we know, or can know, is comprised 

 in the circumference of our individual consciousness 

 enlarged through intersubjective intercourse into the 

 greater sphere of general experience common to many 

 minds. But if we, according to this view, do away with 

 the common-sense aspect of things, according to which 



^ See ante, p. 156. 



