744 PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT. 



belonged to a later period, to a generation out of touch 

 with the aspirations of an earlier age, and in whom 

 the reminiscences had faded away. 



It will not be without help to my readers if I remind 



them how, in our day, certain terms equally undefinable 



have come to govern a large part of our thinking : how, 



11. e.g., the term " evolution " is now indiscriminately used 



Similar ^ '' 



ambiguity and supposcd to couvcy a distinct meaning — how it is 

 Evolution, looked upon by many as a master-key which opens the 

 door of every secret chamber; as a watchword which 

 will allow us to pass every difficulty and emerge safely 

 from the labyrinth of perplexity and doubt. Yet if we 

 look into the matter somewhat more closely, the term 

 " evolution " has been defined by its greatest champion 

 only in the narrowest, purely mechanical sense. 

 Students of Hegel's philosophy may here interpose, and 

 remind us that Hegel himself felt the necessity of 

 defining more exactly what he meant by the term 

 Absolute, that he, in fact adopted a special method, 

 suggested by Fichte — the dialectic method. Unfortun- 

 ately, however, this method did little more than 

 emphasise a purely logical formula, which was even 

 more empty than the later mechanical formula adopted 

 by Spencer. The whole of Hegel's philosophy seemed 

 then to many to be merely an arrangement of an 

 enormous mass of historical and psychological facts 

 according to some dry formula, setting them in a soul- 

 less and ever- repeated rhythmical movement. This it 

 is that Mr Bradley has so well stigmatised as a " ballet 

 of bloodless categories." 



Nevertheless, it is undeniable that both formulas of 



