r A ' 



40 INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE 



good, but only a means to an end, to a higher 

 kind of description which is characteristically 

 scientific. 



When we say that the object of Science is "the 

 complete- and consistent description of the facts 

 of experience in the simplest possible terms," 

 we are adopting a view held by such authorities 

 as Kirchhoff, Mach, Karl Pearson, and Ward 

 which is to many minds disappointing. De- 

 scription seems such a tame term to apply to the 

 function of Science, which, we are told, is to 

 solve the riddles of the universe. 



When we come to think it over, however, or 

 better still, when we try to work it out, "a com- 

 plete and consistent description in the simplest 

 possible terms" is no small achievement. It 

 must leave nothing out, it must be consistent 

 with itself, with the rest of the science of which 

 it forms a part, with Science as a whole, with the 

 formal conditions of experience in general. Of 

 a truth, "complete and consistent description" 

 will tax our intellectual thews and sinews. And 

 it must be in the simplest possible terms, which 

 means penetrating analysis, careful reduction to 

 the lowest common denominator. And the terms 

 must be such as are accessible to direct experience 

 or to indirect experimental testing. Such is the 

 aim of Science. 



Behind the first feeling of disappointment 



