SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 131 



scope. In its constructive Junction^ mejgghysicg 

 aims jit ^nTairround and consistentjyiew of the 

 whole system, and it reac^es~tEis, ^should reach 

 this, not m an a priori fashion, but_by taking, 

 account of the raw material which the sciences 

 furnStT. In this way Science contributes to Meta- 

 pKysics. 



If Metaphysics does not intrude into the prov- 

 ince of any particular science, and if it is not 

 another name for a synthesis of the sciences, what 

 is its province? All thinking has to do with facts 

 of experience, and these form the subject-matter 

 of the sciences. Where, then, does Metaphysics 

 come in? The answer that will suffice for our 

 purpose in this volume is simple enough: that 

 Metaphysics seeks to discover the general condi- 

 tions of giving a complete and consistent formu- 

 lation of experience a formulation which has its 

 foundations in the sciences, but transcends them 

 in an attempt to answer imperious questions 

 which Science does not even ask. 



For most men it is quite impossible to remain 

 satisfied with the systematic descriptions which 

 science supplies, they have to go on to form 

 "some coherent conception of the scheme of 

 things to which they belong," and in this they 

 necessarily become metaphysical. Now it seems 

 good sense that they should try to do this con- 

 sciously and not at random, using the experience 



