PRESIDENT NEWCOMB. 15 



ral course of events goes on in invariable accordance with certain 

 knowable laws. He asks the theologian in the words of Pope : 



" Think'st thou like some weak Prince the eternal cause 

 Prone for his favorites to reverse his laws ? 

 Shall burning ^Etna, if a sage requires, 

 Forget to thunder and recall her fires ? 

 On air or sea new motions be impress'd, 

 O blameless Bethel to relieve thy breast? 

 When the loose moimtain trembles from on high 

 Shall gravitation cease if you go by ? 

 Or some old temple, nodding to its fall, 

 For Chartres' head reserve the hanging wall?" 



To all these questions the other answers, no, and thus all occa- 

 sion for dispute ought to end. But it does not end, by any means ; 

 for he proceeds to criticise the views of the questioner on the . 

 ground of their narrowness, and to inform him that the Creator 

 can, (and, by implication, that he does) so arrange things that 

 any result he may wish shall be brought about by the action of 

 natural laws themselves. "We do not expect ^Etna to recall her 

 fires when a sage is near ; or the air and ocean to acquire new 

 motions to preserve a saint from danger." * * * " Should these 

 individuals not be rushing recklessly against the known laws of 

 Heaven, or should it be the will of God to preserve them, it will 

 be found that provision has been made for their escape, and that 

 not through the powers of nature disobeying their own laws, but 

 through other powers in nature opportunely interposing to stop, 

 to turn aside, or otherwise to modify their operation." 



Now, always supposing that such remarks as these are intended 

 to apply to the domain of sight, hearing and understanding, they 

 differ fundamentally from the scientific theory in their view of what 

 constitutes the laws of nature. The school seems to look upon 

 causes and effects in nature as belonging to two different classes 

 of things. They see an immense collection of causes, to each of 

 which the appropriate effect is tied. So long as the cause is fol- 

 lowed by its effect, the laws of nature are satisfied. So, if the 

 Ruler wants to reward, punish, kill, or rescue, He has only to bring 

 into operation the appropriate cause at the proper moment ; the 

 natural effect follows, and His will is executed without any viola- 

 tion of the laws of nature. I am not sure that this is an exact 

 statement of the views to which I refer ; but it is the best I can 

 gather from the study of the forms in which they have found 

 expression. Supposing this to be the view really entertained, it is 



