4 RELIGION AND SCIENCE. 



of beliefs that have long existed and are widely diffused; 

 and most of all so, in the case of beliefs that are perennial 

 and nearly or quite universal. The presumption that any 

 current opinion is not wholly false, gains in strength accord- 

 ing to the number of its adherents. Admitting, as we must, 

 that life is impossible unless through a certain agreement be- 

 tween internal convictions and external circumstances; ad- 

 mitting therefore that the probabilities are always in favour 

 of the truth, or at least the partial truth, of a conviction; we 

 must admit that the convictions entertained by many minds 

 in common are the most likely to have some foundation. 

 The elimination of individual errors of thought, must give 

 to the resulting judgment a certain additional value. It 

 may indeed be urged that many widely-spread beliefs are 

 received on authority; that those entertaining them make 

 no attempts at verification; and hence it may be inferred 

 that the multitude of adherents adds but little to the proba- 

 bility of a belief. But this is not true. For a belief which 

 gains extensive reception without critical examination, is 

 thereby proved to have a general congruity with the various 

 other beliefs of those who receive it; and in so far as these 

 various other beliefs are based upon personal observation 

 and judgment, they give an indirect warrant to one with 

 which they harmonize. It may be that this warrant is of 

 small value; but still it is of some value. 



Could we reach definite views on this matter, they would 

 be extremely useful to us. It is important that we should, if 

 possible, form something like a general theory of current 

 opinions; so that we may neither over-estimate nor under- 

 estimate their worth. Arriving at correct judgments on dis- 

 puted questions, much depends on the attitude of mind we 

 preserve while listening to, or taking part in, the contro- 

 versy; and for the preservation of a right attitude, it is 

 needful that we should learn how true, and yet how untrue, 

 are average human beliefs. On the one hand, we must 

 keep free from that bias in favour of received ideas which 



