ULTIMATE KELIGIOUS IDEAS. 39 



it as limited. To think of it as limited, necessarily implies 

 a conception of something beyond its limits : it is absolutely 

 impossible to conceive a thing as bounded without conceiv- 

 ing a region surrounding its boundaries. What now must 

 we say of this region? If the First Cause is limited, and 

 there consequently lies something outside of it, this some- 

 thing must have no First Cause — must be uncaused. But 

 if we admit that there can be something uncaused, there is 

 no reason to assume a cause for anything. If beyond that 

 finite region over which the First Cause extends, there lies 

 a region, which we are compelled to regard as infinite, over 

 which it does not extend — if we admit that there is an infi- 

 nite uncaused surrounding the finite caused; we tacitly 

 abandon the hypothesis of causation altogether. Thus it 

 is impossible to consider the First Cause as finite. And if it 

 cannot be finite it must be infinite. 



Another inference concerning the First Cause is equally 

 unavoidable. It must be independent. If it is dependent it 

 cannot be the First Cause; for that must be the First 

 Cause on which it depends. It is not enough to say that it is 

 partially independent; since this implies some necessity 

 which determines its partial dependence, and this necessity, 

 be it what it may, must be a higher cause, or the true First 

 Cause, which is a contradiction. But to think of the First 

 Cause as totally independent, is to think of it as that which 

 exists in the absence of all other existence; seeing that if 

 the presence of any other existence is necessary, it must be 

 partially dependent on that other existence, and so cannot 

 be the First Cause. Not only however must the First Cause 

 be a form of being which has no necessary relation to any 

 other form of being, but it can have no necessary rela- 

 tion within itself. There can be nothing in it which deter- 

 mines change, and yet nothing which prevents change. For 

 if it contains something which imposes such necessities or re- 

 straints, this something must be a cause higher than the 

 First Cause, which is absurd. Thus the First Cause must be 



