CHAPTER IV. 



THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 



§ 22. The same conclusion is thus arrived at, from 

 whichever point we set out. If, respecting the origin and 

 nature of things, we make some assumption, we find that 

 through an inexorable logic it inevitably commits us to al- 

 ternative impossibilities of thought; and this holds true of 

 every assumption that can be imagined. If, contrariwise, 

 we make no assumption, but set out from the sensible prop- 

 erties of surrounding objects, and, ascertaining their special 

 laws of dependence, go on to merge these in laws more and 

 more general, until we bring them all under some most gen- 

 eral laws ; we still find ourselves as far as ever from knowing 

 what it is which manifests these properties to us : clearly as 

 we seem to know it, our apparent knowledge proves on ex- 

 amination to be utterly irreconcilable with itself. Ultimate 

 religious ideas and ultimate scientific ideas, alike turn out 

 to be merely symbols of the actual, not cognitions of it. 



The conviction, so reached, that human intelligence is 

 incapable of absolute knowledge, is one that has been slowly 

 gaining ground as civilization has advanced. Each new 

 ontological theory, from time to time propounded in lieu of 

 previous ones shown to be untenable, has been followed by a 

 new criticism leading to a new scepticism. All possible con- 

 ceptions have been one by one tried and found wanting; and 

 so the entire field of speculation has been gradually exhaust- 

 ed without positive result: the only result arrived at being 



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