78 THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 



be admitted as necessary. On this opinion, therefore, reason 

 is shown to be weak, but not deceitful. The mind is not rep- 

 resented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each 

 other, as equally possible ; but only, as unable to understand 

 as possible, either of two extremes ; one of which, however, 

 on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled 

 to recognize as true. We are thus taught the salutary 

 lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted 

 into the measure of existence ; and are warned from recog- 

 nizing the domain of our knowledge as necessarily co-exten- 

 sive with the horizon of our faith. And by a wonderful 

 revelation, we are thus, in the very consciousness of our in- 

 ability to conceive aught above the relative and finite, in- 

 spired with a belief in the existence of something uncondi- 

 tioned beyond the sphere of all comprehensible reality." 



Clear and conclusive as this statement of the case ap- 

 pears when carefully studied, it is expressed in so abstract a 

 manner as to be not very intelligible to the general reader. 

 A more popular presentation of it, with illustrative applica- 

 tions, as given by Mr Mansel in his " Limits of Religious 

 Thought," will make it more fully understood. The follow- 

 ing extracts, which I take the liberty of making from his 

 pages, will suffice. 



" The very conception of consciousness, in whatever 

 mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction 

 between one object and another. To be conscious, we must 

 be conscious of something ; and that something can only be 

 known, as that which it is, by being distinguished from that 

 which it is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation; 

 for, if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must 

 possess some form of existence which the other has not, or it 

 must not possess some form which the other has. But it is 

 obvious the Infinite cannot be distinguished, as such, from 

 the Finite, by the absence of any quality which the Finite 

 possesses; for such absence would be a limitation. Nor yet 

 can it be distinguished by the presence of an attribute which 



