80 THE RELATIVITY OF ALL KNOWLEDGE. 



out the union of these two factors ; and, in that union, each 

 exists only as it is related to the other. The subject is a sub- 

 ject, only in so far as it is conscious of an object: the object 

 is an object, only in so far as it is apprehended by a subject: 

 and the destruction of either is the destruction of conscious- 

 ness itself. It is thus manifest that a consciousness of the 

 Absolute is equally self -contradictory with that of the Infi- 

 nite. To be conscious of the Absolute as such, we must 

 know that an object, which is given in relation to our con- 

 sciousness, is identical with one which exists in its own na- 

 ture, out of all relation to consciousness. But to know this 

 identity, we must be able to compare the two together ; and 

 such a comparison is itself a contradiction. We are in fact 

 required to compare that of which we are conscious with 

 that of which we are not conscious; the comparison itself 

 being an act of consciousness, and only possible through the 

 consciousness of both its objects. It is thus manifest that, 

 even if we could be conscious of the absolute, we could not 

 possibly know that it is the absolute : and, as we can be con- 

 scious of an object as such, only by knowing it to be what it 

 is, this is equivalent to an admission that we cannot be con* 

 scious of the absolute at all. As an object of consciousness, 

 every thing is necessarily relative; and what a thing may 

 be out of consciousness, no mode of consciousness can tell us. 

 " This contradiction, again, admits of the same explana- 

 tion as the former. Our whole notion of existence is neces- 

 sarily relative; for it is existence as conceived by us. But 

 Existence, as we conceive it, is but a name for the several 

 ways in which objects are presented to our consciousness, — 

 a general term, embracing a variety of relations. The Ab- 

 solute, on the other hand, is a term expressing no object of 

 thought, but only a denial of the relation by which thought 

 is constituted. To assume absolute existence as an object of 

 thought, is thus to suppose a relation existing when the re- 

 lated terms exist no longer. An object of thought exists, as 

 such, in and through its relation to a thinker; while the Ab- 



