138 THE DATA OF PHILOSOPHY. 



words: not that misuse commonly enlarged upon — not the 

 misapplication or change of meaning whence so much error 

 arises; but a more radical and less obvious misuse. Only 

 that thought which is directly indicated by each word has 

 been contemplated; while numerous thoughts indirectly 

 indicated have been left out of consideration. Because a 

 spoken or written word can be detached from all others, it 

 has been inadvertently assumed that the thing signified by 

 a word can be detached from the things signified by all 

 other words. Though more-deeply hidden, the mistake is 

 of the same order as that made by the Greeks, who were 

 continually led astray by the belief in some community of 

 nature between the symbol and that which it symbolized. 

 For though here community of nature is not assumed to the 

 same extent as of old, it is assumed to this extent, that 

 because the symbol is separable from all other symbols, and 

 can be contemplated as having an independent existence, 

 so the thought symbolized may be thus separated and thus 

 contemplated. How profoundly this error vitiates 



the conclusions of one who makes it, we shall quickly see on 

 taking a case. The sceptical metaphysician, wishing his 

 reasonings to be as rigorous as possible, says to himself — 

 " I will take for granted only this one thing." What now 

 are the tacit assumptions inseparable from his avowed as- 

 sumption ? The resolve itself indirectly asserts that there is 

 some other thing, or are some other things, which he might 

 assume ; for it is impossible to think of unity without think- 

 ing of a correlative duality or multiplicity. In the very act, 

 therefore, of restricting himself, he takes in much that is 

 professedly left out. Again, before proceeding he must give 

 a definition of that which he assumes. Is nothing unex- 

 pressed involved in the thought of a thing as defined? 

 There is the thought of something excluded by the definition 

 — there is, as before, the thought of other existence. But 

 there is much more. Defining a thing, or setting a limit to 

 it, implies the thought of a limit; and limit cannot be 



