596 APPENDIX. 



isting, but of whose nature we are in ignorance, is the sphere 

 for religious feeling; he says I hold that the ignorance alone 

 is the sphere for religious feeling! 



When in the first sixteen lines specifically treating of my 

 views, these three cases occur, it may be imagined what an 

 intricate plexus of misrepresentations, misunderstandings, and 

 perversions, fills the three hundred and odd pages forming 

 the volume. Especially may it be anticipated that the meta- 

 physical discussions, occupying five chapters, are so confused 

 that it is next to impossible to deal with them. I must limit 

 myself to giving a sample or two from this part of the work: 

 one of them illustrating Prof. Birks' critical fairness, and the 

 other his philosophic capacity. 



In his chapter on " The Keality of Matter," he says (page 

 111) " The sense of reality in things around us, Mr. Spencer 

 has truly said, is one which no metaphysical criticisms can 

 shake in the least; " and the rest of the paragraph is devoted 

 to enlarging upon this proposition. The next paragraph 

 begins — ' Permanent possibilities of sensation ' is merely an 

 ingenious phrase, to disguise and conceal a self-contradic- 

 tion: " sundry antagonistic criticisms upon this phrase being 

 appended. And then the opening words of the paragraph 

 which succeeds are quoted from First Principles. Xow since 

 the refutation of my views is the aim of the work; and since 

 both the preceding and succeeding passages specifically refer 

 to my work; and since no other name is mentioned; every 

 reader, not otherwise better instructed, will conclude that as 

 a matter of course the phrase " permanent possibilities of 

 sensation " is mine; and that the criticisms upon it tell against 

 me. Even were there evidence that this phrase " permanent 

 possibilities of sensation," expressed, or harmonized with, a 

 doctrine entertained by me; yet as the phrase is not mine, the 

 quoting it as mine would have been a literary misdemeanour. 

 What then must be said of it when, instead of standing for 

 any view of mine, it stands for an opposite view? Mr. Mill's 

 expression, quoted by Prof. Birks as though it were my ex- 

 pression, belongs to a theory of knowledge entirely at variance 

 with that set forth and everywhere impliedini^V^Pn'^c/^/es; 

 and a theory which, where the occasion was fit, I have per- 

 sistently combated (see Principles of Psychology, Part VII. 

 " General Analysis "). And yet Prof. Birks tacitly makes me 

 responsible for the incongruities which result from uniting 

 this theory with the opposed theory. 



