CAN ANIMALS REASON? 13 



extreme edge of the outside of the roadway, so that they 

 may not knock their burden against a jutting-out rock or 

 other prominent obstacle. I may explain that such an 

 accident might cause them to lose their balance and fall 

 over the precipice. We might accept the adoption of this 

 prudent precaution as a proof of forethought, were it not 

 for the fact that all practisers of this habit will adhere 

 to it when no such precaution is necessary. I have ridden 

 many ponies of this kind on wild mountain paths, with a 

 considerable amount of trepidation ; for do what I could 

 to keep them away from the dangerous edge of the cliff, 

 they would rigidly adhere to it, seemingly under the im- 

 pression that the load on their back (myself) projected 

 at least three feet on each side of them. Their prudence, 

 therefore, is the result of experience, and not of reason. 

 Most of my readers will no doubt recall many similar cases 

 among the horses of their acquaintance. I have never 

 seen a loose horse with a trap behind him refrain from 

 trying to go through a narrow gateway, because it was 

 not wide enough to admit the carriage. 



While giving animals full credit for their manifestations 

 of intelligence, we should not forget that some of their 

 instinctive actions often simulate those due to reflection. 

 The extraordinary uniformity which animals of the same 

 species observe in performing actions that at first sight 

 appear to be prompted by reflection, would lead us to 

 ascribe them to blind instinct, rather than to thoughtful 

 intelligence, as, for instance, the ruses of the hare when 

 trying to baffle her pursuers. 



To illustrate the manner in which we may mistake the 

 results of experience for those of reasoning, Professor 

 Lloyd Morgan cites the following case : " Some years ago 

 I was with a friend watching a horse which was dragging 

 a heavy load, zigzagging up a steep hill. ' How well,' said 



