THE CEREBRUM, AND ITS FUNCTIONS. 761 



of forming this determination ; since they would not be able to obtain their food 

 without it. Accordingly, they manifest in their actions a perception or govern- 

 ing idea of distances, which can only be gained by Man after long experience. 

 A fly-catcher, for instance,, just come out of its shell, has been seen to peck at 

 an insect, with an aim as perfect as if it had been all its life engaged in learn- 

 ing the art. In some cases, animals seem to learn that, by intuitive perception, 

 at which Man could only arrive by the most refined processes of reasoning, or by 

 the careful application of the most varied experience. Thus, a little fish, named 

 the Chsetodon rostratus, is in the habit of ejecting from its prolonged snout, drops 

 of fluid, which strike insects that happen to be near the surface of the water, 

 and cause them to fall into it, so as to come within its own reach. Now by the 

 laws of refraction of light, the place of the Insect in the air will not really be 

 that at which it appears to the Fish in the water ; but it will be a little below 

 its apparent place, and to this point the aim must be directed. But the differ- 

 ence between the real and the apparent place will not be constant; for the more 

 perpendicularly the rays enter the water, the less will be the variation; and, on 

 the other hand, the more oblique the direction, the greater will be the difference. 

 Now it is impossible to imagine but that, by an intuitive perception, the real 

 place of the Insect : is known to the Fish in every instance, as perfectly as it 

 could be to the most sagacious Human mathematician who might determine it 

 in each case by a process of calculation, or to a clever marksman who had 

 learned it practically by a long experience. 



793. Just as the simple feelings of pleasure or pain are associated with par- 

 ticular sensations ( 759), the same feelings connect themselves with particular 

 Ideas; and thus are produced those Emotional states of mind, which, directly 

 or indirectly, determine a great part of our habits of thought, and are largely 

 concerned in the government of our conduct. The formation of a true desire, 

 even for the gratification of some bodily appetite, requires that an idea of the 

 object of desire shall have been formed; and it is the expectation of the pleasure 

 which will arise from the performance of the act in question, or of the pain 

 which will be produced by abstinence from it, which makes the idea a motive to 

 action. A careful analysis of the various Propensities, Moral Feelings, Senti- 

 ments, &c., which are ranked by Metaphysicians under the general term 

 " active principles/' will show (the Author believes) that such is the essential 

 nature of all. Thus, Benevolence is the pleasure in the happiness of others; 

 and shows itself alike in the habitual entertainment of the abstract or general 

 idea, and in the direction of the conduct in any particular instance. So there 

 is a positive pleasure, in some ill-constituted minds, in the contemplation of the 

 wihappiness of others ; and this we designate as Malevolence. Again the Coin- 

 bativeness of Phrenologists is nothing else than the pleasurable idea of setting 

 one's self in antagonism with others ; which may manifest itself either physically 

 or psychically, according to the temperament of the individual. 1 So Pride (or 

 self-esteem) consists in the pleasurable contemplation of our own superior excel- 

 lencies; whilst the essence of Vanity (or love of approbation) lies in the plea- 

 surable idea of the applause of others. Again, in Conscientiousness we have the 



1 There are individuals who never manifest the least degree of physical combativeness, 

 who yet show a remarkable love of opposition in all their psychical relations with others. 

 That objections will be raised by such persons to any plan that may be proposed, we can 

 always feel sure, though we may not have the remotest idea as to what the objection may 

 be in each particular case. Persons in whom this tendency exists in a less prominent 

 degree are apt to see objections and difficulties first, although their good sense may subse- 

 quently lead them to consider these as of less account, or to be outweighed by the advan- 

 tages of the scheme. Such was the case with the late Sir Robert Peel. On the other 

 hand, those who are spoken of as of sanguine temperament are apt to lose sight of the 

 intervening difficulties, in the pleasurable idea of the result. 



