T62 OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 



love of right, that is, the association of pleasure with the idea of right; Venera- 

 tion may be defined as the pleasurable contemplation of rank or perfections 

 superior to our own; and the source of Ambition, which is in some degree the 

 antagonistic tendency, lies in the pleasurable idea of self-exaltation. In like 

 manner, Hope is the pleasurable contemplation of future enjoyment; Fear is 

 the painful contemplation of future evil ; and Cautiousness is the combination of 

 the desire to avoid anticipated pain with the pleasurable contemplation (an 

 extremely strong feeling in many individuals) of precautions adapted to ward 

 it off. The same view may be applied to the love of Truth, of Beauty, of Sub- 

 limity, of Goodness, of Order, of Possessions, of Country, &c. ; and also to Cheer- 

 fulness, Wit, Humor, &c., and to many conditions usually considered as purely 

 Intellectual. And in fact, the association of sensor ial pleasure with any idea, 

 or class of ideas, gives to it an Emotional character; so that the Emotional states 

 are not by any means limited within the categories which most Psychologists 

 have attempted to lay down; these being, for the most part, generic terms, 

 which comprehend certain groups of ideas bearing more or less similarity to each 

 other, but not by any means including all possible combinations. 1 By those 

 who regard the Propensities, Moral Feelings, &c., as simple states of mind, it 

 is usually said that their indulgence or exercise is attended with pleasure, and 

 the restraint of them with pain. But, if the view here taken be correct, it is the 

 very coexistence of pleasurable or painful feelings with the idea of a given 

 object, that causes desire or aversion as regards that object ; since the mind 

 instinctively pursues what is pleasurable, and avoids what is painful. And thus, 

 according to the readiness with which these different classes of ideas are excited 

 in different minds (partly depending upon original constitution, and partly upon 

 the habitual direction of the thoughts), and to the respective degrees in which 

 they respectively call forth the sensorial feelings of pleasure or pain (as to which 

 there is obviously an inherent difference amongst individuals, analogous to that 

 which exists with regard to the feelings of pleasure or pain excited by external 

 sensations, sights, sounds, tastes, odors, or contacts), will be the disposition of 

 the mind to entertain them, the frequency with which they will be brought 

 before the mental view, and the influence which they will exert in the determi- 

 nation of our conduct. 2 



' The truth of this statement must be apparent to all who are familiar with the mani- 

 festations of Eccentricity and Insanity ; for we frequently see pleasurable feelings associat- 

 ing themselves with ideas, which to ordinary minds appear indifferent or are even regarded 

 with pain ; and thus are engendered motives, which exert a most powerful influence over 

 the conduct, and which, if not kept in restraint by the Will, render the whole being their 

 slave. It may be also remarked, in this place, that the impossibility of classing all the 

 Emotional states of mind under a limited number of categories, constitutes a most serious 

 and fundamental objection to any system which professes to mark out in the Cerebrum 

 distinct seats for the Animal Propensities, Moral Feelings, &c. 



2 The above view of the nature of Emotional states was first developed by the Author 

 in an article on the "Physiology of the Brain, " in the "British and Foreign Medical Re- 

 view," October, 1846. It was not until he had thought out the subject for himself, on the 

 physiological basis which is here given to it, that his attention was directed to Mr. James 

 Mill's masterly "Analysis of the Human Mind," as containing a very similar doctrine. It 

 has been a great satisfaction to him to find that a Metaphysician of so high a rank had 

 anticipated his conclusions, and this upon psychological grounds only ; since it gives him 

 the more confidence in the truth of the physiological doctrines with which he has con- 

 nected them. His principal point of difference from Mr. Mill lies in the greater difference 

 which he believes to exist between ideas and sensations ; for he cannot, with Mr. Mill, re- 

 gard an Idea as a mere " trace or copy of the sensation, which remains after the sensation 

 ceases," but must consider it as a state of mind altogether different, excited or induced 

 by sensations ; and consequently, he does not consider the emotional state to consist in 

 the anticipation of a future pleasurable sensation, since the pleasure is generally associated 

 with ideational states which have no analogy whatever to the sensations which excited 

 them. Thus the Love of Praise does not consist in the association of pleasure with the 



