812 OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 



by a feeling of internal necessity (analogous to that which prompts the reflex 

 actions of the Cranio-Spinal axis), or solicits it by the anticipation of pleasure 

 in its result, or of pain in abstinence from it. On the other hand, the man in 

 full possession of his psychical capacity, whilst equally amenable with those in 

 the foregoing states to the influence of the motive power of ideas, differs from 

 them all in this most important particular that he has the power of refraining 

 from action under the immediate pressure of motives, and of so far modifying 

 their relative force by the mode in which he contemplates them, that their ori- 

 ginal balance may be completely altered ; and hence his ultimate determination, 

 whilst still governed by the predominance of motives, may be entirely different 

 from that on which he would have acted, if he had given way to his first im- 

 pulse. For, just as we may direct our Intellectual operations by an exercise of 

 Volition, so as to fix upon certain ideas only, out of the many which present 

 themselves to our consciousness, and to limit our attention to certain peculiar 

 aspects of these ( 823), so may we fix our attention upon any one or more 

 among the motives which tend to determine our action, and keep these (as it 

 were) in a strong light before the mind's eye, whilst by withdrawing our atten- 

 tion from others, we virtually throw them into the background, just as we can 

 do with regard to objects of sensation. And further, by calling the Reasoning 

 powers into operation, and bringing them to bear upon the questions at issue, 

 so as to follow out each of the modes of action that are before the mind to its 

 probable consequences, the Will indirectly brings a set of new motives, arising 

 out of these consequences, before the judgment ; and these, at first overlooked, 

 may become important elements in the decision. On the other hand, it may be 

 that in thus reasoning out the probable consequences of an action, motives 

 which at first presented themselves in great strength, lose more or less of their 

 force, and even become altogether futile. It is in these modes that " second 

 thoughts" generally prove to be best, save where selfish considerations are 

 brought to take the place of primary generous impulses ; whilst a hasty determi- 

 nation often leads to wrong action, because all the motives that should be taken 

 into account have not been duly weighed. 1 



836. Now, if we examine into the different kinds of Motive Powers, which, 

 under the permission or the intentional direction of the Will, are the sources 

 of Human action, we shall find that they may be ranged under the following 

 heads : (1) Previously-acquired Habits, which automatically incite us to do as 

 we have been previously accustomed to do under the like circumstances, with- 

 out the idea of prospective pleasure or pain, or of right or wrong, being at all 

 present to our minds. The formation of Habits, both of thought and action, 

 seems referable to the psychical principle of Contiguous Association ( 807) and 

 to the physiological principle of Nutritive Assimilation ( 591), which, in regard 

 to the operations of the Cerebrum, seem to be only different expressions of the 

 same fact; namely, that whatever mode of activity has been once strongly im- 

 pressed on the organ, this has a tendency to perpetuate itself. In so far as the 

 Will yields to this tendency, instead of controlling it, the individual becomes 

 the slave of routine; and this condition is often very remarkably presented by 



1 It has been held by some, that when a man is struggling with a temptation, and the 

 motives to good and the motives to evil are nearly in equilibrium, like weights in the two 

 scales of the balance, the Will acts as an independent preponderating power, like a hand 

 pushing down the scale-beam on one side. It appears to the author, however, to be much 

 more conformable to the results of a careful examination of our own conduct, to regard 

 the will as imparting an augmented gravity (as it were) to the weights on one side, by 

 directing attention to their value, 'and by indirectly making additions to them, in the man- 

 ner stated above ; whilst it diminishes the force of those on the other side, by preventing 

 the mind from giving its attention to them, and also (it may be) by virtually abstracting 

 some of them from the scale. 



