814 OF THE FUNCTIONS OF THE NERVOUS SYSTEM. 



considerations which are simply prudential, these usually having reference to 

 the remoter effects which our actions are likely to have upon our own welfare or 

 upon that of others, and thus bringing before the mind, as elements in its de- 

 termination, certain additional objects of desire or aversion. (3) Notions of 

 Right and of Duty, which, so far as they attach themselves to our actions, give 

 them a moral and religious character. These may act simply as ideas, whose 

 coercive power depends upon the intensity with which they are brought before 

 the mind ; but they obtain a much stronger influence, when they acquire an 

 Emotional character from the association of the feeling of desire with the idea 

 of obligation ; that is, when we feel a wish to do that which we are conscious 

 we ought to do. This association is one which it is peculiarly within the ca- 

 pability of the Will to cherish and strengthen. And still more powerful is 

 the operation of these combined motives, when a constant habit of acting upon 

 them has been formed ; for the strongest desires are then immediately repress- 

 ed, the strongest aversions cease to exert an influence, when once the question is 

 looked at in its moral aspect, and a clear perception has been attained of its 

 right and its wrong side. 1 



837. It has been usually considered by Moralists and Theologians that Con- 

 science^ or the Sense of Duty, is an autocratic faculty, which unmistakably 

 dictates what is right in each individual case, and which should consequently be 

 unhesitatingly obeyed as the supreme and unerring guide. Now this view of 

 the case is attended with practical difficulties, which make it surprising that it 

 can ever have been entertained. For it must be obvious to every one who 

 carefully considers the matter, that, whilst a notion of right and wrong, attach- 

 ing itself to certain actions, is as much a part of the moral nature of every in- 

 dividual, as the feeling of pleasure or pain attaching itself to certain states of 

 consciousness is of his sensational nature, yet the determination of what is right 

 and what is wrong is a matter in great degree dependent upon education, habits 

 of thought, conventional associations, &c. ; so that the moral standard of no two 

 men shall be precisely alike, and the moral standards of men brought up under 

 entirely different circumstances shall be of the most opposite nature. 3 So, whilst 



1 The difference between the habitual, the prudential, and the moral aspects of the very 

 same action, may be made apparent by a very simple illustration. We will suppose that 

 a man has been accustomed to take a ride every day at a particular hour ; his whole 

 nature so accommodates itself to the habit, that he feels both mentally and physically uncom- 

 fortable at any interruption to the usual rhythm. But suppose that, just as the appointed 

 hour comes round, the sky becomes overcast, threatening the rider with a drenching if he 

 perseveres in his attention, his decision will then be founded on a prudential considera- 

 tion of the relative probabilities of his escaping or of his being exposed to the shower, and 

 of how far the enjoyment he may derive from his ride is likely to be replaced by the dis- 

 comfort of a thorough wetting. But suppose, further, that, instead of taking a mere plea- 

 sure ride, a medical man is about to set forth on a professional visit to a patient whose 

 condition requires his aid ; a new motive is thus introduced, which alters the condition of 

 the whole question, making it no longer one of prudence only, but one of morality. An- 

 other motive which should give the question a moral aspect, would be consideration for 

 himself, and the risk of life or health he might run ; this should be decisive where the mo- 

 tive which impels him to the act in question is merely that of self-gratification ; but if it 

 bring into antagonism his duty to his patient and his desire to benefit him, and on the 

 other hand his duty to himself and his regard for the ulterior welfare of those who may 

 be immediately dependent upon him, the question has its right and its wrong aspect on 

 both sides, and the right may only be determined after a careful balance of probabilities. 

 Such moral conflicts are continually occurring amongst medical practitioners in regard to 

 exposure to the severity of the weather, to dangerous infection, or to risks of other kinds ; 

 and the decision will mainly depend upon the previously formed habits, on the one hand 

 of disregarding all considerations connected with self, on the other of attaching special 

 weight to them. 



2 Without having recourse to the strange estimates of right and wrong which prevail 

 amongst Savage nations, for an illustration of this position, it may be sufficient to compare 

 the different views conscientiously entertained on the question of Slavery, by high-minded, 

 estimable, and Christian men and women in different parts of the American Union. 



