00CTRINE OF MATERIALISM. 9$ 



from another, is it possible that all these sepa- 

 rate parts should, in that state, be one indivi-* 

 dual conscious being? Suppose then all these 

 particles brought together into one system, so 

 as to touch one another, will they thereby, or 

 by any motion or composition whatever, be- 

 come one whit less truly distinct beings than 

 they were, when at the greatest distance ? How 

 then can their being disposed in, any possible 

 system make them one individual conscious 

 being ? If you would suppose God, by his 

 infinite power, superadding consciousness to 

 the united particles, yet still these particles, be- 

 ing really and truly as distinct beings as ever, 

 cannot be themselves the subject in which that 

 individual consciousness inheres : but the con-* 

 sciousness can only be snperadded by the addi- 

 tion of something, which, in all the particles, 

 must still itself be but one individual being. 

 The soul, therefore, whose power of thinking is 

 undeniably one individual consciousness, can- 

 not possibly be a material substance." If, how- 

 ever, it be supposed that the soul is a material 

 substance, and that the brain, or any other 

 part whatever is the organ where it resides, it 

 must evidently follow that the quality of this 

 organ must be made up of the individual qua- 

 lities of all its parts : for example, the bulk of 

 the body is made up of the sum of the magni- 

 tude of all its parts ; its motion is nothing but 



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