THE MEANING OF PERCEPTION 177 



Is it not rather absurd to distinguish quite rigidly between the 

 objective and the subjective ? Of course, for idealism everything 

 is subjective, but for realism what is the difference, or, rather, 

 where does the objective region merge into the subjective one ? 

 What is the sensible object, say, in hearing a gramophone play ? 

 Is it the nervous change in the auditory region of the cerebral 

 cortex, or the nervous impulse, or the vibrations of the auditory 

 membrane, or the sound waves in the air, or the vibrations of 

 the diaphragm of the gramophone, or the scraping of the needle 

 along the groove in the disc, or the vibrations of the vocal cords 

 of the person who sang the record, or what in a series of stages 

 still further back indefinitely until one gets tired of enumerating 

 them ? Nevertheless, common sense recognises something that 

 is, in a kind of way, the object of our recognition — either the 

 gramophone, or the disc, or the singer. Is it a new " record " ? 

 Then that is the object. Or a new machine with a different kind 

 of door or shutter that makes it more resonant ? That is the 

 object. Or a new song by a well-known vocalist ? Then she is 

 the object. Is it not plain from this analysis (which an ingenious 

 reader can make in other cases) that the objective in our per- 

 ception is that phase of an endless series of phases which interests 

 us, on which we have acted in some kind of way (for we bought 

 the machine, or record), or on which we intend to act (for we 

 may decide to go and hear the vocalist in person) ? 



" Subjective " and " objective " are therefore attitudes on our 

 (part to something which is happening, and they are attitudes 

 yjthat are entirely relative to our interests for the time being. 

 And remember that to speak of " something " which is happen- 

 ing is rather a convenient than a strictly accurate way of speak- 

 ing. Is there something which moves or vibrates or causes a 

 phenomenon ? There may be, said Kant, a noumenon, or thing 

 in itself, v/hich moved or vibrated. We do know the movement 

 or vibration, but we cannot possibly know the thing in itself. 

 Why, then, speak about it ? But again common sense does 

 familiarly speak about things in themselves, and so does experi- 

 mental science, and for the same reason: it is convenient to do 

 so, and it assists us in our acting and investigating. Just in the 

 same common-sense way we pick out from a long or indefinitely 

 prolonged train of events some one which is more accessible to 

 our action, or which interests us particularly, and we say that is 

 the sensible object. To a cerebral physiologist the chemical 



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