THE EOOT-riHNCirLES OF MIXD. 47 



CHAPTER IV. 



The Root-itjxciples of Mixd. 



Ai.tiiougit the phenomena of Mind, and so of Choice, are 

 both complex, and as to their causation obscure, I think we 

 have now seen that we are justified in believing that they all 

 present a physical basis. That is to say, whatever opinion 

 we may happen to entertain regarding the ultimate nature of 

 these phenomena, in view of the known facts of physiology, 

 we ought all to be agreed concerning the doctrine that the 

 mental processes which we cognize as subjective, are the 

 psychical equivalents of neural processes which we recog- 

 nize as objective. As already stated, I have elsewhere con- 

 sidered the various hypotheses concerning the nature and the 

 various attempts at an explanation of this equivalency 

 between mental processes and neural processes ; but here I 

 desire to consider the fact of this equivalency merely as a 

 fait. It will therefore signify nothing to my discussion 

 whether, with the materialists, we rest in this fact as final, or 

 endeavour, with men of other schools, to seek an explanation 

 of the fact of some more ultimate character. It is enough 

 if we are agreed that every psychical change of which we 

 have any experience is invariably associated with a definite 

 physical change, whatever we may suppose to be the nature 

 and significance <>i' this association. 



Looking, then, at the phenomena of Mind as invariably 

 ; enting a physical, or, as we may indifferently call it, a 

 physiological side, I shall endeavour to point out what I cm- 

 ceive to be the most ultimate principle of physiology which 



analysis shows to 1m- common to them all. On the mental 



side, as we have already seen, we have no difficulty in dis- 

 tinguishing this ultimate principle, or common i haraoteristic, 

 a- that which we designate by the term Choice. Now if the 

 power of choice is the distinctive peculiarity of a mental 



