PERCEPTION. 129 



stages ; they constitute rather one uniform growth on which, 

 as in the case of Memory, I have arbitrarily marked these 

 several grades of evolution. Moreover, it will be evident 

 that the term " Perception " is really a very wide one, and 

 may be said to cover the whole area of psychology, from the 

 confines of an almost unfelt sensation up to the recognition 

 of an obscure truth in science or philosophy. On this 

 account the term has been condemned by some psychologists 

 as too extensive in its application to be distinctive of any 

 particular faculty ; but nevertheless it is clearly impossible to 

 do without it, and if we are careful to remember the sense in 

 which we employ it — whether with reference to the lower or 

 to the higher faculties of mind — no harm can arise from its use. 

 I have just said that in the highest stage of its develop- 

 ment Perception involves Inference ; and I have previously 

 said that in its lowest stages it involves Memory. I must 

 now point out more particularly that in its ascending stages 

 Perception involves Memory of ascending stages. Thus the 

 perception shown by a new-born infant of sweet tastes as 

 distinguished from sour tastes and the rest, implies the 

 presence of that lowest stage of memory which we have seen 

 to consist in cognizing a present sensation as like a past sen- 

 sation. Again, the power of discerning a change of milk 

 implies the power of cognizing a present sensation as unlike 

 a past sensation. Next, when memory advances to the stage 

 of associating ideas by contiguity, perception also advances 

 to the stage of re-cognizing objects with their qualities and 

 relations of coexistence and sequence. This in turn leads to 

 the power of recognizing objects, qualities, and relations by 

 similarity — the power on which we have seen the next phase 

 of memory to depend. And, lastly, from this point onwards 

 perception throughout depends exclusively upon the associa- 

 tion of ideas, no matter how elaborate or refined such 

 fciation may become. 



The fact that perception is thus everywhere and indis- 

 Bolubly bound up with memory, is an important fact to be 

 clear about; far when memory becomes bo habitual as to be 

 \ irtwally automatic or unconscious, we are apt to lose sight of 

 the connection between it and perception. Thus, as Mr. 

 Spencer observes, we do not speak of remembering that the 



sunshines; yet we speak of perceiving that the sun shines. 



As a matter of fact, however, we do remember that the sun 



