IMAGINATION. 143 



Bain, and others, wno also maintain, with considerable pro- 

 bability, that the cerebral change accompanying the idea of a 

 past sensation is the same in kind and place, though not in 

 degree of intensity, as was the cerebral change which accom- 

 panied the original sensation.* 



In its next stage of development Ideation may be re- 

 garded as the memory of a simple perception, and imme- 

 diately after this the principle of association by contiguity 

 comes in. Later on there arises association by similarity, 

 and from this point onwards Ideation advances by abstrac- 

 tion, generalization, and symbolic construction, in ways and 

 degrees which will constitute one of the topics to be con- 

 sidered in my next work. 



From this brief sketch, then, it will be seen that we have 

 already considered the lowest stages of Ideation while treating 

 of Memory and the Association of Ideas. Resuming, there- 

 fore, the analysis at the point where we there left it, I shall 

 devote this chapter to a consideration of those higher phases 

 of the idea-forming powers which we may conveniently in- 

 clude under the general term Imagination. 



Now, under this general term we include a variety of 

 mental states, which although all bearing kinship to one 

 another, are so diverse in the degree of mental development 

 which they betoken that we must begin by analyzing them. 



As used in popular phraseology, the word Imagination is 



• Thus, Mr. Spencer says, " The idea is an imperfect and feeble repetition 

 of the original impression . . . There is first a presented manifestation of the 

 vivid order, and then, a iter wards, there may come a represented manifestation 

 that is like it except in being much less distinct." (First Principles, p. 1 l,">.) 

 And Professor Bain says, " What is the manner of occupation of the brain with 

 a resuscitated feeling of resistance, a smell, or a sound? There is only one 

 answer thai seems admissible. The renewed feeling occupies the very same 

 parts, and in the same manner, as the original feeling, and no other parts, 

 ii'ir m ami utlier ateignable manner." (Senses and Intellect, p. 338.) While 



quite assenting to tin* view of ideation, so far as tin- psychology of t ho sub- 



jiet is concerned, I think we are much too ignorant of the physiologl of 



cerebration to indulge in any such confident assertions respecting "the precise 



•nd manner of the formation of ideas. Again, wit I) reference to M r. 



Spencer's riews, it is needless to repeat the point in which I disagree with 

 bun touching the earliest stages of memory— or those before the advent t f 

 the association of ideas. Only I may point out that as the simplest possible 



idea is held to eon-u-t in a faint re\i\;il of a -in-nt ion (as distinguished from 



a perception), it follow.-, that the occurrence of the implest possible idea 



precedes the occurrence of its association with anj other idea; and if so, 



the im mnrii of thi 'ii, or the fainl revival of the sensation in which 



the idi i i- beld to oonsist, must also prece le ani association with other faint 



n ■. ivali ol I be tame Kind. 



