330 MENTAL EVOLUTION IN ANIMALS. 



Recurring now to my views on the origin and develop- 

 ment of Reason, it will have been noticed that they differ 

 materially from those of Mr. Herbert Spencer, and, therefore, 

 looking to the influence which he justly exerts upon all 

 matters relating to psychological analysis, I feel that it is 

 desirable to enter at some length into an explanation of the 

 ground on which I have been here reluctantly compelled to 

 disagree with him. Possibly the divergence between us may 

 not be so important as at present I am led to suppose ; but if 

 it should hereafter admit of being shown that such is not the 

 case, I need scarcely say that the fact would be a matter of 

 sincere gratification to me. 



According to Mr. Spencer, Reason arises out of " com- 

 pound reflex action " or " Instinct," when this reaches a 

 certain level of compounding or complexity.* Now I have 

 already given the considerations which induce me to differ 

 from Mr. Spencer in regarding Instinct as compound reflex 

 action, and therefore it is only in a general way that I am 

 able to agree with him in his theory of the origin and de- 

 velopment of Reason. Nevertheless, in a general way I am 

 able to agree with him, and therefore I shall begin by stating 

 the points in which I do so. 



First he says : — " The impossibility of establishing any 

 line of demarkation between the two [Instinct and Reason] 

 may be clearly demonstrated. If every instinctive action is 

 an adjustment of inner to outer relations, and if every 

 rational action is also an adjustment of inner relations to 

 outer relations ; then, any alleged distinction can have no 

 other basis than some difference in the characters of the 

 relations to which the adjustments are made. It must be 

 that while, in Instinct, the correspondence is between inner 

 and outer relations that are very simple or general ; in Reason, 

 the correspondence is between inner and outer relations that 

 are complex, or special, or abstract, or infrequent. But the 

 complexity, speciality, abstractness, and infrequency of rela- 

 tions, are entirely matters of degree. . . . How then 

 can any particular phase of complexity or infrequency be 

 fixed upon as that at which Instinct ends and Reason 

 begins ? "f 



With this statement I quite agree, provided I am allowed 



* See Principles of Psychology, i, pp. 253-71. 

 + Loc. cd., pp. 453-4. 



