REASON. 339 



equal the ants and bees in respect of drawing intelligent 

 inferences. Furthermore, looking to the animal kingdom as 

 a whole, I should say that while there is no very constant 

 relationship between the powers of instinct and those of 

 intelligent inference, such relationship as there is points 

 rather" to the view that the complexity of mental organization 

 which finds expression in a high development of the instinc- 

 tive faculties, is favourable to the development of the more 

 intelligent faculties.* And that there should be such a 

 general correspondence is no more than the theory of evolu- 

 tion might lead us to expect; for the progressive complica- 

 tion of instincts tends to diminish, as Mr. Spencer observes, 

 their purely automatic character. But, on the other hand, 

 that this correspondence should be general and not constant 

 might also be anticipated, seeing that instincts may arise 

 either without the precedence of intelligence, or by means of 

 the lapsing of intelligence. 



In the next place, as regards Man, I do not think thai 

 Mr. Mivart's argument is any more satisfactorily established 

 by fact. It is no doubt true that " the more instinctive are a 

 man's actions the less are they rational, and vice versd;" but 

 this, again, is no more than we should expect, on the hypo- 

 thesis of human instincts being due to hereditary experience, 

 while processes of conscious inference are chiefly due to indi- 

 vidual experience. It thus happens that the instinctive 

 actions preponderate over the intelligent actions during 

 infancy, and that the scale begins to turn during childhood. 

 But in all this there is nothing to show that the two are 

 distinct in kind; and in subsequent life their generic identity 

 i. shown l>y the fact that the principle of Lapsing intelligence 

 may cause, even iii the experience of the individual, actions 

 which are at first consciously adaptive or rational to become 

 by repetition automatic oi instinctive. 



To what misconception, then, are we to ascribe the very 

 prevalent doctrine that lleason is the special prerogative of 



M in | I think the misconception arises from an erroneous 

 meaning which is attached to the word Reason. Mr. Mivart, for 

 instance, habitually follows the traditional usage, and invests 

 the word with the meaning that belongs t<> Belf-conscious 

 Thought. Thus la' expressly says that in denying Reason to 



• cr Poueket, " L'ltuixMci ehu le$ Iiuedts," in Rev. <!ts Dm* Mondet, 

 Feb. is7", i>. 600. 



