1891.] [Bache. 



thinking, that the author is more interesting than his book. But 

 that was evidently not the intention of the lecturer, as set forth 

 in his printed Syllabus of the lecture course, but to make critical 

 study of specimens of the higher literature, upon the assumption 

 of general knowledge of, love for, or at least capacity to learn to 

 appreciate, the productions of master minds in the various pro- 

 vinces of literary art. 



A statement in Mr. Moulton's lecture, much more worthy of 

 notice, however, because it involved a dangerous thing to say 

 before a mixed audience, without due qualification to forestall 

 any possible misunderstanding as to the limited reach of the 

 declaration, was contained in his repudiation of all authority for 

 the laws of grammar, clinching the assertion by the remark that 

 in England they do not " set so much store as we in America by 

 Lindley Murray." He declared unreservedly, and proceeded to 

 argue, that so-called laws of grammar are not binding, so re- 

 peatedly enforcing the point by using the expression of one of 

 his correspondents, whom he cited as charging that Browning's 

 Caliban " speaks bad grammar," as to impress the listener with 

 the belief that he himself regards that expression as good Eng- 

 lish. That the sentiment was quite agreeable to some scattered 

 groups among the audience was very evident from the gentle 

 murmur of assent and the incipient stir of applause that arose 

 among them. He w r ent on to say that the popular impression 

 that grammatical law is binding arises from confounding two 

 different senses in which the word is used as defining two 

 diverse things. Now, the idea of law, as everywhere appre- 

 hended, however imperfectly formulated as a statement of fact 

 or obligation, however even provisional, has, as a term, but one 

 signification. Relating to physical phenomena, it contains the 

 affirmation of correspondence between cause and effect, authori- 

 tative with man. Relating to man, whether as supernally or 

 humanly ruled, it contains the assertion of authority as defining 

 conditions and imposing upon him obedience. Whether, then, 

 the idea is expressed with reference to nature beyond or within 

 man's control, the term corresponds with it, and always relates 

 to that which he regards as authoritative. 



Most unfortunate for Mr. Moulton's plea was the distinction 

 which he attempted to draw between legislative laws and the law 

 of custom in language. The essential difference between them, 



