4O PROCEEDINGS OF THE BOLL WEEVIL CONVENTION. 



tion to be paid in cases where property is damaged, as well as taken, 

 for public purposes, no similar provision being contained in the Con- 

 stitution of 1868 or previous Constitutions of the State. This additional 

 instance, however, where the owner may be compensated for damage 

 done his property by the State, as well as in the cases where it may 

 be entirely taken, refers to cases where the property is damaged by 

 the State in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and not 

 where it is injured in the exercise of the police power of the State. 



This article of the Constitution was in force at the time the suit of 

 Egan vs. Hart was brought, for the latter was instituted after the 

 adoption of the Constitution of 1879, and upon a state of facts arising 

 after its adoption. In that case plaintiff sued only for damages done 

 to the property by certain levee work, which she claimed resulted in a 

 depreciation of its value, etc., and not because her property had been 

 taken from her, and, notwithstanding the fact that article 156 of the 

 Constitution of 1879 entitled all persons to be compensated for the 

 damage done their property, as well as where it is actually taken by 

 the State, the Supreme Court refused her demand, because the injury 

 complained of by her was done, not in the exercise of the right of 

 eminent domain, but of the police power of the State. 



The case of" L'Hote vs. City of New Orleans, 51 An., 93, is one 

 where, although injury was alleged to have been done to plaintiff's 

 property and its value diminished by reason of the ordinance of the 

 City Council in respect to the limits within which houses of prostitution 

 might be located, the Supreme Court held that the injury suffered 

 was damnum absque injuria, since the ordinance was within the ex- 

 ercise of the police powers of the City Council. This case went to 

 the Supreme Court of the United States, which decided against the 

 plaintiff in error. That Court, referring to the complaint of plaintiff in er- 

 ror that the city ordinance, if enforced, would injure the value of his prop- 

 erty, said : "It is said that this operates to depreciate the pecuniary value 

 of the property belonging to the plaintiff in error, but a similar result 

 will follow if other limits were prescribed, and, therefore, the power 

 to prescribe limits could never be exercised, because, whatever the 

 limits, it might operate to the pecuniary disadvantage of some property 

 holders. The truth is that the exercise of the police power often works 

 pecuniary injury, but the 'settled rule of this Court is that the mere 

 fact of pecuniary injury does not warrant the overthrow of legislation 

 of a police character." See 177 U. S., p. 589, citing Fertilizing Co. vs. 

 Nyde Park, 97 U. S., 659, and Mugler vs. Kansas, 123 U. S., 623, in 

 both of which it was held that individuals hold their property subject 

 to the ordinary and reasonable exercise of the police powers of the 

 State, not entitling them to compensation for injury sustained in the 

 proper exercise of such power by the State. 



