112 SCIENCE AND PSEUDO-SCIENCE m 



This is undoubtedly one of the most singular 

 propositions that I have ever met with in a 

 professedly scientific work, and its rarity is 

 embellished by another direct self-contradiction 

 which it implies. For on the preceding page 

 (67), when the Duke of Argyll is speaking of the 

 laws of Kepler, which he admits to be laws, and 

 which are types of that which men of science 

 understand by "laws," he says that they are 

 " simply and purely an order of facts." Moreover, 

 he adds : " A very large proportion of the laws of 

 every science are laws of this kind and in this 

 sense." 



If, according to the Duke of Argyll's admission, 

 law is understood, in this sense, thus widely and 

 constantly by scientific authorities, where is the 

 justification for his unqualified assertion that such 

 statements of the observed order of facts are not 

 " entitled to the rank " of laws ? 



But let us examine the consequences of the 

 really interesting proposition I have just quoted. 

 I presume that it is a law of nature that "a 

 straight line is the shortest distance between two 

 points." This law affirms the constant association 

 of a certain fact of form with a certain fact of 

 dimension. Whether the notion of necessity 

 which attaches to it has an a priori or an a 

 posteriori origin is a question not relevant to the 

 present discussion. But I would beg to be 

 informed, if it is necessary, where is the " com- 



