20 HUME I 



Hume then points out that, in his time, the 

 authority of the Commons was by no means equiva- 

 lent to the property and power it represented, and 

 proceeds: 



" Were the members obliged to receive instructions from 

 their constituents, like the Dutch deputies, this would en- 

 tirely alter the case; and if such immense power and 

 riches as those of all the Commons of Great Britain, were 

 brought into the scale, it is not easy to conceive that the 

 crown could either influence that multitude of people, or 

 withstand that balance of property. It is true the crown 

 has great influence over the collective body in the elections 

 of members ; but were this influence, which at present is 

 only exerted once in. seven years, to be employed in bring- 

 ing over the people to every vote, it would soon be wasted, 

 and no skill, popularity, or revenue could support it. I 

 must, therefore, be of opinion that an alteration in this 

 particular would introduce a total alteration in our govern- 

 ment, would soon reduce it to a pure republic ; and, per- 

 haps, to a republic of no inconvenient form." (III. 35.) 



Viewed by the light of subsequent events, this 

 is surely a very remarkable example of political 

 sagacity. The members of the House of Commons 

 are not yet delegates; but, with the widening of, 

 the suffrage and the rapidly increasing tendency 

 to drill and organise the electorate, and to exact 

 definite pledges from condidates, they are rapidly 

 becoming, if not delegates, at least attorneys for 

 committees of electors. The same causes are con- 

 stantly tending to exclude men, who combine a 

 keen sense of self-respect with large intellectual 

 capacity, from a position in which the one is as 



