86 HUME ii 



It really matters very little in what sense terms 

 are used, so long as the same meaning is always 

 rigidly attached to them; and, therefore, it is 

 hardly worth while to quarrel with this generally 

 accepted, though very arbitrary, limitation of the 

 signification of "knowledge." But, on > the face of 

 the matter, it is not obvious why the .impression 

 we call a relation should have a better claim to 

 the title of knowledge, than that which we' call a 

 sensation or an emotion; and the restriction has 

 this unfortunate result, that it excludes all the 

 most intense states of consciousness from any claim 

 to the title of " knowledge." 



For example, on this view, pain, so violent 1 and 

 absorbing as to exclude all other forms of con- 

 sciousness, is not knowledge; but becomes a part of 

 knowledge the moment we think of it in relation to 

 another pain, or to some other mental phenome- 

 non. Surely this is somewhat inconvenient, for 

 there is only a verbal difference between having a 

 sensation and knowing one has it: they are simply 

 two phrases for the same mental state. 



But the " pure metaphysicians " make great 

 capital out of the ambiguity. For, starting with 

 the assumption that all knowledge is the per- 

 ception of relations, and finding themselves like 

 mere common-sense folks, very much disposed to 

 call sensation knowledge, they at once gratify that 

 disposition and save their consistency, by declar- 

 ing that even the simplest act of sensation con- 



