100 HUME m 



pain, of colours, of sounds, and of all similar things must 

 be innate, in order that the mind may represent them 

 to itself, on the occasion of certain motions of matter with 

 which they have no resemblance." 



Whoever denies what is, in fact, an inconceiv- 

 able proposition, that sensations pass, as such, from 

 the external world into the mind, must admit the 

 conclusion here laid down by Descartes,, that, 

 strictly speaking, sensations, and a fortiori, all the 

 other contents of the mind, are innate. Or, to 

 state the matter in accordance with the views pre- 

 viously expounded, that they are products of the 

 inherent properties of the thinking organ, in which 

 they lie potentially, before they are called into 

 v existence by their appropriate causes. 

 /., But if all the contents of the mind are innate, 

 twhat is meant by experience? 



It is the conversion, by unknown causes, of 

 these innate potentialities into actual existences. 

 The organ of thought, prior to experience, may be 

 compared to an untouched piano, in which it may 

 be properly said that music is innate, inasmuch as 

 its mechanism contains, potentially, so many 

 octaves of musical notes. The unknown cause of 

 sensation which Descartes calls the " je ne sais 

 quoi dans les objets " or " choses telles qu'elles 

 sont," and Kant the " Noumenon " or " Ding an 

 sich," is represented by the musician; who, by 

 touching the keys, converts the potentiality of the 

 mechanism into actual sounds. A note so pro- 

 duced is the equivalent of a single experience. 



