130 HUME v 



thus becomes what all the world recognises as a 

 belief. The fallacy which Hume combats is, that 

 the proposition, or verbal representative of a be- 

 lief, has come to be regarded as a reality, 

 instead of as the mere symbol which it really is; 

 and that reasoning, or logic, which deals with 

 nothing but propositions, is supposed to be neces- 

 sary in order to validate the natural fact symbol- 

 ised by those propositions. It is a fallacy similar 

 to that of supposing that money is the foundation 

 of wealth, whereas it is only the wholly unessen- 

 tial symbol of property. 



In the passage which immediately follows that 

 just quoted, Hume makes admissions which might 

 be turned to serious account against some of his 

 own doctrines. 



" But though animals learn many parts of their knowl- 

 edge from observation, there are also many parts of it which 

 they derive from the original hand of Nature, which much 

 exceed the share of capacity they possess on ordinary occa- 

 sions, and in which they improve, little or nothing, by the 

 longest practice and experience. These we denominate IN- 

 STINCTS, and are so apt to admire as something very extra- 

 ordinary and inexplicable by all the disquisitions of human 

 understanding. But our wonder will perhaps cease or di- 

 minish when we consider that the experimental reasoning 

 itself, which we possess in common with beasts, and on 

 which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a 

 species of instinct or mechanical power, that acts in us un- 

 known to ourselves, and in its chief operations is not directed 

 by any such relations or comparison of ideas as are the 

 proper objects of our intellectual faculties. 



" Though the instinct be different, yet still it is an in- 



