v THE MENTAL PHENOMENA OF ANIMALS 133 



desire of the grain; thirdly, a volition to seize it? 

 Or, are only the sensational terms of the series 

 actually represented in consciousness? 



The latter seems the more probable opinion, 

 though it must be admitted that the other alter- 

 native is possible. But, in this case, the series of 

 mental states which occurs is such as would be 

 represented in language by a series of propositions, 

 and would afford proof positive of the existence 

 of innate ideas, in the Cartesian sense. Indeed, a 

 metaphysical fowl, brooding over the mental 

 operations of his fully-fledged consciousness, might 

 appeal to the fact as proof that, in the very first 

 action of his life, he assumed the existence of the 

 Ego and the non-Ego, and of a relation between 

 the two. 



In all seriousness, if the existence of instincts 

 be granted, the possibility of the existence of in- 

 nate ideas, in the most extended sense ever im- 

 agined by Descartes, must also be admitted. In 

 fact, Descartes, as we have seen, illustrates what 

 he means by an innate idea, by the analogy of 

 hereditary diseases or hereditary mental peculiari- 

 ties, such as generosity. On the other hand, hered- 

 itary mental .tendencies may justly be termed in- 

 stincts; and still more appropriately might those 

 special proclivities, which constitute what we call 

 genius, come into the same category. 



The child who is impelled to draw as soon as it 

 can hold a pencil; the Mozart who breaks out into 



