172 HUME TIII 



large our view, and opposing one species of superstition to 

 another, set them a quarrelling ; while we ourselves, dur- 

 ing their fury and contention, happily make our escape 

 into the calm, though obscure, regions of philosophy." 

 (IV. p. 513.) 



Thus it may be fairly presumed that Hume ex- 

 presses his own sentiments in the words of the 

 speech with which Philo concludes the "Dia- 

 logues." 



" If the whole of natural theology, as some people seem 

 to maintain, resolves itself into one simple, though some- 

 what ambiguous, at least undefined proposition, That the 

 cause or causes of order in the universe probably bear some 

 remote analogy to human intelligence : If this proposition 

 be not capable of extension, variation, or more particular 

 explication : If it affords no inference that affects human 

 life or can be the source of any action or forbearance : 

 And if the analogy, imperfect as it is, can be carried no 

 further than to the human intelligence, and cannot be 

 transferred, with any appearance of probability, to the 

 other qualities of the mind ; if this really be the case, what 

 can the most inquisitive, contemplative, and religious man 

 do more than give a plain philosophical assent to the 

 proposition, as often as it occurs, and believe that the argu- 

 ments on which it is established exceed the objections 

 which lie against it? Some astonishment indeed will natu- 

 rally arise from the greatness of the object ; some melan- 

 choly from its obscurity ; some contempt of human reason, 

 that it can give no solution more satisfactory with regard 

 to so extraordinary and magnificent a question. But believe 

 me, Cleanthes, the most natural sentiment which a well- 

 disposed mind will feel on this occasion, is a longing desire 

 and expectation that Heaven would be pleased to dissipate, 

 at least alleviate, this profound ignorance, by affording 

 some more particular revelation to mankind, and making 



